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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
CHARLES B. ROBISON, Case Editor
EVIDENCE - IDENTIFICATION BY
VoicE.-[Pennsylvania] One Stra-
tigoes was robbed in his place of
business by three men who im-
mediately thereafter blinded him,
apparently merely to prevent sub-
sequent identification. Four months
later defendants were arrested on
suspicion of other crimes not con-
nected with the one in question.
A "show up" was conducted at the
police station, and Stratigoes, after
hearing the voices of a number of
persons, identified those of defend-
ants as belonging to the men who
had injured him. Defendants were
indicted for mayhem and robbery.
The only evidence for the state was
an account of the identification of
defendants through their voices.
There was no evidence that the
voices in question had any pecu-
liar characteristics. No examina-
tion was held in open court to test
the accuracy of the identification.
Defendants introduced consider-
able evidence tending to prove
alibis. A conviction resulted,
which was reversed by the appel-
late court. Held: Evidence of iden-
tification by voice alone is danger-
ous evidence. As developed by the
prosecution it does not seem suffi-
ciently substantial to support a
conviction, particularly in view of
the well substantiated alibis on the
part of both defendants. Corn-
monwealth v. Derembeis, 182 Atl.
85 (Pa. 1935).
Identification of an accused per-
son as the guilty party is as essen-
tial as proof of the corpus delicti in
every crime. Booker v. State, 76
Ala. 22 (1885); People v. Nelson,
85 Cal. 421, 24 Pac. 1006 (1890);
State v. Powers, 72 Vt. 168, 47 Atl.
830 (1900). Generally speaking,
the identification of the accused as
the guilty party may be shown
through any means by which the
particular individuality can be dif-
ferentiated from that of every
other individuality. Mclnerney v.
United States, 143 Fed. 729 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1906). Witnesses have been
allowed to base their conclusions
on a number of considerations:
appearance, Brown v. Common-
wealth, 187 Ky. 829, 220 S. W. 1052
(1920); size, Hogan v. Common-
wealth, 212 Ky. 813, 280 S. W. 104
(1926); voice, Orr v. State, 225 Ala.
642, 144 So. 867 (1932); Penning-
ton v. State, 91 Fla. 446, 107 So.
331 (1926); Ogden v. People, 134
Ill. 599, 25 N. E. 755 (1890); Deal
v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. E. 930
(1895); Dorchester Trust Co. v.
Casey, 268 Mass. 494, 176 N. E. 178
(1929); State v. Berezuk, 331 Mo.
626, 55 S. W. (2d) 949 (1932);
handwriting, State v. Hauptman,
180 AtL 809 (N. J. 1935); State v.
Manley, 211 Iowa 1043, 233 N. W.
[1211
110 (1930); palm prints, State v.
Dunn, 161 La. 532, 109 So. 56
(1926); finger prints, People v.
Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 109 N. E. 618
(1915); State v. Combs, 200 N. C.
671, 158 S. E. 252 (1931); State v.
Witzell, 175 Wash. 146, 26 Pac. (2d)
1049 (1933); footprints, People v.
Searcey, 121 Cal. 1, 53 Pac. 359
(1898); People v. Buckner, 281 II.
340, 117 N. E. 1027 (1917). See 1
WicMopx, EVIDENCE (2d. ed. 1923)
757, 758, 760.
In any case where the sufficiency
of identification evidence is in
question the court must consider
four things: (1) The intrinsic re-
liability of the evidence in ques-
tion, (2) the opportunity of the
witness to make his observations,
(3) the qualifications of the wit-
ness to observe and give his opin-
ion on the particular type of evi-
dence in question, (4) corroborat-
ing circumstances. Further than
this it is difficult to generalize, and
each case must be decided on its
own facts.
Perhaps the most reliable and
exact of all identification evidence
is that relating to finger prints.
Where identity has been the im-
portant issue at a trial, courts of
review have taken judicial notice
of the fact that no two finger prints
are alike, and have not been re-
luctant to affirm convictions based
on the testimony of finger print
experts alone. Castleton's Case, 3
Crim. App. 74 (1909); Parker v.
The King, 14 Comm. L. R. 681
(1912); State v. Connors, 87 N. J.
L. 419, 94 Atl. 812 (1915); Smith
v. State, 54 Okla. Cr. Rep. 236,
18 P. (2d) 282 (1933). Accord:
Braley v. State, 54 Okla. Cr.
Rep. 219, 18 P. (2d) 281 (1932);
State v. Johnson, 37 N. M. 280, 21
P. (2d) 813 (1933); State v. Wit-
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zell, supra. The same attitude is
taken toward palmprints. State v.
Dunn, supra; State v. Kuhl, 42
Nev. 185, 175 Pac. 190 (1918);
State v. Lapan, 101 Vt. 124, 141
Atl. 686 (1928). See People v.
Les, 267 Mich. 648, 656, 255 N. W.
407, 410 (1934), where the court
says: "We are satisfied that finger
prints and palm prints are a more
certain and exact method of iden-
tification than a comparison of hair
and eyes, height, weight and even
physical defects. Their use af-
fords more protection to the inno-
cent man than do the more usual
modes of identification."
Some courts have shown a ten-
dency to distrust handwriting evi-
dence even when given by ex-
perts, and cautionary instructions
to the jury in this regard have
been held proper. State v. Man-
ley, supra; State v. Van Tassel, 103
Iowa 6, 72 N. W. 497 (1897). But
see State v. Hauptman, supra,
where the conviction was affirmed
despite the fact that the trial judge
had refused to instruct the jury
that the opinion of handwriting
experts is proof of "low degree."
Types of evidence other than
those already referred to shade off
into varying degrees of unreliabil-
ity. Evidence as to appearance,
size and various physical peculiari-
ties is less substantial and reliable
and entitled to less weight, primar-
ly because it is so often based on
mere opinion formed from very
casual observations. Brown v.
Commonwealth, Hogan v. Com-
monwealth, supra. On the very
same facts, persons equally honest
and equally intelligent may often
draw contrary conclusions and
mere positiveness of opinion does
not change the actual fact. While
evidence of trailing by blood-
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hounds is admissible (State v.
Evans, 115 Kan. 538, 224 Pac. 492
(1924)), it is generally held that
this class of evidence is merely
cumulative or corroborative, and
not sufficient of itself to support a
conviction. Copley v. State, 153
Tenn. 189, 281 S. W. 460 (1926).
When it comes to the question
of identification by voice, courts
are faced with the most hazardous
and unreliable type of identity
evidence. The court in State v.
Karas, 43 Utah 506, 136 Pac. 788
(1913), indicates that most courts
will require that testimony of
recognition of the voice of a per-
son should be reasonably positive
and certain, and based upon some
peculiarity of the person's voice, or
upon sufficient preyious knowledge
by the witness of such person's
voice. Accord: Patton v. State,
117 Ga. 230, 43 S. E. 523 (1903);
Givens v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. Rep.
562, 34 S. W. 626 (1896); Andrews
v. Commonwealth, 100 Va. 801, 40
S. E. 935 (1902). Courts have said
that a witness may testify that
statements made over the tele-
phone were statements of the ac-
cused, where the witness is able
to recognize the voice. State v.
Usher, 136 Iowa 606, 111 N. W. 811
(1907); People v. Strollo, 191 N.
Y. 42, 83 N. E. 473 (1908). A wit-
ness who has overheard a conver-
sation between the accused and the
deceased may describe the tone of
voice used as angry or pleasant
Campos v. State, 50 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 289, 97 S. W. 100 (1906).
However, in both of these situa-
tions he is subject to the qualifica-
tions set forth above.
It is possible to criticize the court
in the instant case in view of the
fact that the complaining witness
several times positively identified
the voices of defendants from a
large group of persons at the police
"show up." See People v. Martin,
304 Ill. 494, 136 N. E. 711 (1922);
People v. DeSuno, 354 Ill. 387, 188
N. E. 466 (1933). On the other
hand, it should be remembered
that human senses and memory
are faulty at best. See Brown,
An Experience in Identification
Testimony (1934) 25 J. Crim. L.
621. In this case the court was
dealing with identification by voice,
the flimsiest and least reliable of
all identification evidence. It was
not even shown that the voices of
defendants were in any way pe-
culiar or unusual. The identify-
ing witness had not heard the de-
fendants' voices before the time
of the crime or afterwards until
the police "show up." It should
be further noted that voice and
voice alone was relied upon. The
witness, being blind, was unable to
identify defendants by their ap-
pearance. There were no cor-
roborating circumstances, but on
the contrary, defendants presented
well substantiated alibis. Such
evidence should be received with
care. Viewing the case as a whole,
it is difficult to say that the court's
decision was unwarranted.
LYLE E. PEacE.
FoRmR JEOPARDY - WAIVER BY
HABEAS CORPus - SUNDAY JUDG-
mENT.-[New York] The relator's
trial for disorderly conduct com-
menced Saturday before a police
magistrate and a jury, but he was
not found guilty and sentenced.
until Sunday. Asserting that the
sentence was void because entered
on Sunday he obtained a dis-
charge on a writ of habeas corpus.
Upon again being charged with
124 RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
the same offense on the same in-
formation he alleged that he had
already been placed in jeopardy
because of the first trial, and upon
this ground he obtained a dis-
charge on a second writ of habeas
corpus. The Appellate Division re-
versed the order of the Special
Term sustaining this second dis-
charge. 281 N. Y. S. 86 (1935).
On appeal, reversed and the order
sustaining the discharge affirmed.
Held: The former trial placed the
relator in jeopardy and he could
not be retried for the same offense,
notwithstanding the fact that the
court had no jurisdiction to sen-
tence him on Sunday. One judge
dissented, asserting that the relator
had waived his jeopardy by hav-
ing the conviction set aside through
his own initiative. People ex rel.
Meyer v. Warden of Nassau County
Jail, 269 N. Y 426, 199 N. E. 647
(1936).
At common law courts were for-
bidden to function on Sunday.
Swann v. Broome, 3 Burr. 1595, 97
Eng. Rep. 999 (1764). In several
states this rule still obtains, and it
has been held that judgments en-
tered on Sunday are void. Higgen-
botham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 101 So.
233 (1924); Devault v. Sampson,
114 Kan. 913, 221 Pac. 284 (1923)
(judgment entered on plea of guil-
ty); Ex Parte Thompson v. San-
ders, 334 Mo. 1100, 70 S. W. (2d)
1051 (1934); Moss v. State, 131
Tenn. 94, 173 S. W. 859 (1915).
This rule has long been confirmed
in New York. N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws
(Cahill, 1930) c. 31, §5; People v.
Luhrs, 29 N. Y. S. 789 (1894); Peo-
ple ex. rel. Martineau v. Brunnell,
236 N. Y. S. 586 (1929), noted
(1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 288. But
judgments may be entered on Sun-
day on a plea of guilty. N. Y.
Laws (1930) c. 602; People v.
Wells, 276 N. Y. S. 543 (1934).
In the present case, the former
judgment being void and jeopardy
having attached when the relator
was arraigned and the jury sworn
(People ex. rel. Pulko v. Murphy,
280 N. Y. S. 405 (1935)), habeas
corpus was a proper remedy to
raise the question of double jeop-
ardy when he was charged with
the same offense the second time.
Bens v. United States, 266 Fed. 152
(C. C. A. 2d, 1920), cert. denied,
254 U. S. 634 (1920); People ex
rel Cohen v. Collins, 265 N. Y. S.
475 (1933). But the fact that jeop-
ardy has once attached does not
necessarily preclude a new trial in
every case. A new trial is not
barred when the jury is discharged
in cases of manifest necessity. 1
WHARTON, CamiNAL LAW (9th ed.
1923) §§998 (3), 1035. Similarly,
where the verdict of the first trial
is a nullity, a second trial may be
had. Houston v. United States, 5
F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925);
Allen v. State, 13 Okla. Cr. Rep.
533, 165 Pac. 745 (1917). Where
the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the trial, a
defendant cannot plead double
jeopardy. Peterson v. State, 79
Neb. 132, 112 N. W. 306 (1907);
Rudd v. Hazzard, 259 N. Y. S. 18
(1932). The present case, as the
dissent points out, is similar to
those in which a court has lost
jurisdiction because the term ended
before the verdict was rendered.
In re Scrafford, 21 Kan. 527 (1879);
State v. Jeffers, 64 Mo. 376 (1877).
A new trial was granted in these
cases. In the instant case the trial
was proper and valid up to the
time the court lost jurisdiction by
holding over into Sunday, and it
would not seem unreasonable to
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conclude that a new trial could be
had.
But the dissent is not strictly ac-
curate in saying that the relator
waived his plea of double jeopardy
by instituting proceedings on his
own initiative to challenge the
legality of his conviction, because
the waiver doctrine is generally
applied to cases where an appeal
or writ of error is used to set aside
the conviction. The doctrine rests
upon the principle that a defend-
ant who by his own act brings
about a retrial in place of his con-
viction, cannot be heard to say he
is then placed in double jeopardy,
and thus go unpunished. See dis-
senting opinion, 199 N. E. at 650.
To petition for habeas corpus in
such a case is not to ask for a
retrial, but is to deny the courts
jurisdiction to hear the case at all.
However, this reasoning has been
applied even when habeas corpus
has been used, and the technical
distinctions between habeas corpus
and appeal or writ of error have
been disregarded. Bryant v. United
States, 214 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 8th,
1914); Marshall v. State, 73 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 531, 534, 166 S. W. 722,
724, 1915A L. R. A. 526. Under the
circumstances of the present case
a practical solution would have
been to allow a new trial to de-
termine the guilt or innocence of
the accused, instead of releasing
him to go free.
Russi.i, PAcARD.
FOURTENmH A mmrN - DuE
PRocEss - CoNVIcTIoN BASED ox
INVOLuNTARY CoNrEssioN.--:[Fed-
eral] Defendants, three negroes,
were coerced by torture of the
most brutal nature, in which sev-
eral deputy sheriffs participated, to
confess to the commission of a
homicide. They were indicted for
murder. Counsel were hurriedly
appointed. After a preliminary ex-
amination, the trial court admitted
the confessions in evidence, and
a conviction followed. The Su-
preme Court of Mississippi af-
firmed, holding that defendants
should have requested the exclu-
sion of the confessions and that
the withdrawal of the privilege
against self-incrimination is not a
denial of due process. Brown v.
State, 173 Miss. 542, 158 So. 339,
161 So. 465 (1935). On certiorari
to the United States Supreme
Court, reversed. Held: Convic-
tions which rest solely upon con-
fessions shown to have been bru-
tally extorted by state officers are
inconsistent with the due process
of law required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brown v. Mississippi,
56 S. Ct. 461 (1936).
A state criminal proceeding, per-
haps more than any other, is a
matter of purely local as distin-
guished from national concern.
Nevertheless, it is well established
that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a def-
inite limitation on state powers in
this regard. Cf. Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) (the
privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not restrict the state in its con-
duct of a criminal trial). Recently
the Supreme Court has shown a
tendency toward more frequent in-
tervention in these matters. See
Nutting, The Supreme Court, The
Fourteenth Amendment and State
Criminal Trials (1936) 3 Chi. L.
Rev. 244. The instant case follow-
ing as it does closely upon the
famous Scottsboro decisions (Pow-
ell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932);
126 RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587
(1935); Patterson v. Alabama, 294
U. S. 600 (1935)), confirms this
tendency and serves once more to
focus interest on the supervisory
power of the United States Su-
preme Court over state criminal
proceedings.
A review of the state proceed-
ing may be obtained, as in the in-
stant case, by writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court to the
state court of last resort. Powell
v. Alabama, supra. A second
method of obtaining review by the
federal courts is by petition for
habeas corpus, either in the federal
district court (Downes v. Duna-
way, 53 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 5th,
1931)), or originally in the Su-
preme Court. See Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U. S. 340 (1935).
Before this writ will be granted,
however, it must appear that all
remedies in the state courts have
been exhausted. Hale v. Crawford,
65 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933);
Mooney v. Holohan, supra (peti-
titioner must not only have ap-
pealed to the highest state court
but he must have petitioned for
habeas corpus in a state court);
Comment (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev.
404. The accused may also re-
move from the state to the federal
district court if he is denied the
federal right by a state statutory
or constitutional provision. This
procedure has been strictly limited
(Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313
(1879)) and has been little used
in recent years.
The Supreme Court has shown
extreme reluctance, except in cases
where the violation of federal
rights is apparent, to exercise its
supervisory power over state crim-
inal procedure. The Court's at-
titude is well expressed by Justice
Holmes in Ashe v. Valotta, 270 U.
S. 424, 426 (1926): "In so deli-
cate a matter as interrupting the
regular administration of the crim-
inal law of the State-too much
discretion cannot be used, and it
must be realized that it can be
done only upon definitely and nar-
rowly limited grounds." The de-
tails of state procedure will not
be interfered with. As was said in
Frank v. Magnum, 237 U. S. 309,
340 (1915), "Repeated decisions of
this court have put it beyond the
range of further debate that the
'due process' clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment has not the ef-
fect of imposing on the states any
particular form or mode of pro-
cedure, so long as the essential
rights of notice and a hearing, or
the opportunity to be heard, before
a competent tribunal are not inter-
fered with." Thus it was held in
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516
(1884), that to proceed by informa-
tion rather than by a grand jury's
indictment was not to deny due
process. In Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U. S. 581 (1900), it was indicated
that a state might constitutionally
do away with trial by jury. Twin-
ing v. New Jersey, supra, estab-
lished that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not secure to an ac-
cused the privilege against self-
incrimination or limit the states in
the same manner that the first
eight Amendments to the Consti-
tution limit the federal government.
Although the right to be present at
the trial seems to be an element
of due process (see Hoyt v. Utah,
110 U. S. 574 (1883)), defendant
must show that his absence worked
a substantial injury to his cause.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S.
97 (1933) (defendant was not pres-
ent at yiew), noted (1934 24 J.
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Crim. L. 1102. Presence when the
jury returns its verdict is not es-
sential if the defendant waived the
right. Frank v. Magnum, supra.
It is difficult to say, except in
the most general terms, what con-
stitutes a denial of due process by
the state court. The Supreme
Court will look at the whole case
and will not interfere unless it ap-
pears that the state trial has been
grossly unfair and the accused has
been deprived of some fundamental
right. See Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.
S. 425, 434 (1905); Herbert v.
Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316
(1926). Systematic exclusion of
negroes from jury service has been
held a denial of due process. Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880);
Norris v. Alabama, supra; Note
(1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 776. See
Comment (1934) 29 II. L. Rev.
498. A judge cannot constitution-
ally have a direct pecuniary inter-
est in a conviction. Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U. S. 510 (1927). Following a
suggestion made in Frank v. Mag-
num, supra, the Court has held
that mob domination of a state
trial renders that trial a nullity
and contravenes the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U. S. 86 (1923). Similarly, a
conviction based on perjured testi-
mony intentionally used by the
prosecuting attorney cannot stand.
Mooney v. Holohan, supra, noted
(1935) 35 Col L. Rev. 282, (1935)
25 J. Crim. L. 943. Where ignor-
ant negroes were rushed through a
trial to a conviction without the
benefit of counsel they were held to
have been denied due process.
Powell v. Alabama, supra; Note
(1933) 23 J. Crim. L. 841; Com-
ment (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 245.
A state statute permitting convic-
tion for syndicalism without sup-
porting evidence has met with the
Court's displeasure (Fisk v. Kan-
sas, 274 U. S. 510 (1927)), as has
an arbitrary presumption against
the accused raised by a statute
making criminal the leasing of
lands to aliens. Morrison v. Cali-
fornia, 291 U. S. 82 (1933); Com-
ment (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 102.
See generally Nutting, supra.
The Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi dismissed the constitutional
objections in the instant case on
the technical ground that, even if
the admission of the forced con-
fessions constituted a withdrawal
of the privilege against self-in-
crimation, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not contravened. But
the United States Supreme Court
properly refused to consider the
case on any such narrow issue.
"That complaint," it said, at 465,
"is not of the commission of mere
error, but of a wrong so funda-
mental that it made the whole pro-
ceeding a mere pretense of a trial
and rendered the conviction and
sentence wholly void." Again it
said, "The rack and the torture
chamber may not be substituted
for the witness stand. . . . It
would be difficult to conceive of
methods more revolting to the
sense of justice than those taken to
procure the confessions of these
petitioners, and the use of the con-
fessions so obtained was a clear
denial of due process." The stock
objections to Supreme Court action
in these cases, viz., that it infringes
on state sovereignty, that it is a
means of delay, and that it will
cast an undue burden on the Su-
preme Court by a multiplicity of
suits seem insignificant as one
reads this decision. Admitting
that such inconveniences exist,
they would seem to be more than
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justified by such a salutory result
as was reached in this case. As
long as such conditions as are de-
scribed in this decision can exist
in the administration of justice by
the states, a supervisory power in
the Supreme Court is both desir-
able and necessary.
C. IVES WALDO, JR.
CONSPIRAcY-EvIDENCE NECESSARY
TO SUSTAIN CONVICTIO.-[Federal]
One Nash, who had escaped from
the federal prison at Leavenworth
was apprehended by federal agents
and was being returned to prison
when three gangsters, armed with
machine guns, attempted to effect
his escape. In the ensuing fray
three police officers, the prisoner,
and one federal agent were killed.
Defendants, although they did not
participate in the attack were
charged with conspiracy to vio-
late a federal law providing that:
"It shall be unlawful for any per-
son to procure the escape of any
prisoner properly committed to the
custody of the Attorney General
or to advise, connive at, aid, or
assist in such escape, or to conceal
any such prisoner after such es-
cape." 46 STAT. 327 (1930), 18 U.
S. C. A. §753 (i) (1935). The evi-
dence tended to show that all of
the defendants, some of whom were
women, had been closely associ-
ated with the outlaws who com-
mitted the actual murders, and that
they had rendered assistance to
Nash during the time he was at
large. It was shown that all of
the defendants were of bad char-
acter. Evidence was introduced to
show that defendants made tele-
phone calls to the place of the mur-
ders shortly before they occurred.
Defendants were convicted. On
appeal, affirmed. Held: Conspira-
cy may be proved by circumstan-
tial evidence. The evidence is
sufficient to'sustain the conviction.
Galatas v. United States, 80 F. (2d)
15 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). [Certiorari
denied, 56 S. Ct. 574 (1936).]
The term "conspirators" appar-
ently originated in the ordinance of
33 EDw. I (1274) which was di-
rected against "confederacy and
alliance for the false and malicious
promotion of indictments and pleas,
etc." Blackstone defined it as the
"crime where two or more conspire
to indict an innocent man of fel-
ony falsely and maliciously, who
is accordingly indicted and ac-
quitted." Digby, Law of Criminal
Conspiracy in England and Ire-
land (1890) 6 L. Q. Rev. 129,
130. But, in the Poulterer's case, 9
Co. Rep. 55 (1611), the Star Cham-
ber held that an agreement for
a conspiracy was itself indictable,
whether the conspiracy was ac-
tually carried out or not. This
concept of conspiracy was ex-
panded and frequently used by the
later English courts. WRImH, LAW
OF CammAL CONSPIRACIRS AND
AGREEMENTS (1873) 8. In fact,
combinations designed to effect any
ends which were generally con-
sidered unjust or pernicious were
at first regarded as criminal con-
spiracies. Digby, supra at 134.
The reason conspiracies were made
criminal was generally due to the
danger to the public, or to indivi-
duals, because of the increased
power which resulted from the
combination. State v. Dalton, 134
Mo. App. 517, 114 S. W. 1132
(1908); 2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW
(9th ed. 1923) 180; Holdsworth,
Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal
Process (1921) 37 L. Q. Rev.
467. It is now the well-established
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common law rule that the crime is
committed when there is an agree-
ment to do an "unlawful act, or
to do a lawful act by unlawful
means." Lord Denman in Jones
case, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (1832).
This doctrine continued in use
notwithstanding the fact that Den-
man had apparently repudiated it.
See Regina v. Peck, 112 Eng. Rep.
1372, 1374 (1839). Many Ameri-
can states follow the common law
rule that the unlawful agreement
in itself completes the offense and
that an overt act is not necessary.
People v. Cohen, 358 II. 326, 198
N. E. 150 (1934); Garland. v. State,
112 Md. 83, 75 Atl. 631 (1910);
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 229
Pa. 609, 79 Atl. 222 (1911); Smith
v. State, 8 Ala. App. 187, 62 So.
575 (1913); State v. Dalton, supra.
Some state statutes, however, re-
quire an overt act. People v. Miles,
108 N. Y. S. 510 (1908); People v.
Johnson, 22 Cal. App. 362, 134 Pac.
339 (1913).
In the federal courts the prose-
cution must show an overt act to
complete the federal offense of
conspiracy. 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18
U. S. C. A. 88 (1927); United States
v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33 (1879);
Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S. 62, 76
(1905); Hyde v. United Scates, 225
U. S. 347, 359 (1912). Further, it
has been held that to constitute a
conspiracy against the United
States the object of. the unlawful
agreement must be the commission
of some offense against the United
States in the sense only that it
must be some act made an offense
by the laws of the United States.
United States v. Lyman, 190 Fed.
414 (D. C. Ore., 1911); Heike v.
United States, 227 U. S. 131 (1913).
The only case, other than the in-
stant one, that has arisen under
18 U. S. C. A. §753 (i) (1930) is
Hale v. United States, 65 F. (2d)
673 (1933). There, defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to aid a
prisoner to escape from a federal
penitentiary by "smuggling in" to
him some saws which he used to
effect his escape. The evidence of
the government was largely cir-
cumstantial, but the conviction was
sustained on the ground that it was
for the jury to decide the weight
to be given to the evidence and
witnesses. In the instant case the
court said, "conspiracy is rarely
susceptible of direct and positive
proof, but may be proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence." Similar
statements appear in Smith v.
United States, 157 Fed. 721, 728
(C. C. A. 8th, 1907) (conspiracy
to deprive certain citizens of their
rights); Feigenbutz v. United
States, 65 F. (2d) 122, 124 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1933) (conspiracy to violate
National Prohibition Act); People
v. Cohn, supra (conspiracy to ob-
tain money by false pretenses).
There is even authority for con-
victing a person who has been only
indirectly connected with the con-
spiracy. In Tomplain v. United
States, 42 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A.
5th, 1930), the court said: "Where
a conspiracy is established but
slight evidence connecting a de-
fendant therewith may still be sub-
stantial, and if so, sufficient."
Conspiracy has become a sort of
"catch-all" to punish all kinds of
combinations considered socially
dangerous. Chief among its uses
in early times in this country was
against labor disturbers. Fischer
v. State, 101 Wis. 23, 70 N. W. 594
(1898) (threats of violence);
Loewe v. Calif. State Fed. of Labor,
139 F. 71 (1905) (boycott); Frank-
lin Union v. People, 220 IML 355,
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77 N. E. 176 (1906). Since the
determination of what is a con-
spiracy is largely a question of fact,
we find that "the law of conspiracy
certainly is in a very unsettled
state. The decisions have gone on
no distinctive principle nor are
they always consistent." Justice
Gibson in Mifflin v. Common-
wealth, 5 Watts S. 461 (Pa. 1845).
Most of the evidence in this case
was circumstantial; much of it
tended but indirectly to implicate
the defendants. But taken as a
whole it seems clearly to establish
that defendants actively partici-
pated in the conspiracy to aid in
the escape and concealment of the
prisoner, Nash. The instant case is
thus an excellent example of the
use to which a prosecutor may put
conspiracy statutes. All members
of a gang of criminals who con-
tributed in any way to the perpe-
tration of crime may be brought
to justice, without the necessity of
proving that each was present at
the time the conspiracy culmi-
nated in murder, robbery or other
specific offense. See also Note




[Federal] In a prosecution for
attempt to evade the income tax,
after the case had been submitted
to the jury, there was a request
for further instruction on reason-
able doubt. The court thereupon
instructed the jury that if they
were convinced of defendant's
guilt to that degree of certainty
upon which they would act in their
own important affairs, then they
were convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt. The court then at-
tempted to illustrate this standard
by comparing reasonable doubt to
the doubt which a juror might
have as to whether a price offered
for his property was as much as he
could hope to obtain. The jl1ry re-
turned a verdict of guilty and
judgment was entered accordingly.
The above instruction was assigned
as error. On appeal, reversed.
Held: Such an instruction is er-
roneous as practically eliminating
the doctrine of reasonable doubt.
Paddock v. United States, 79 F.
(2d) 872 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
Under Anglo-American law in
criminal cases every man is pre-
sumed to be innocent until he is
proved to be guilty. It is the duty
of the court to instruct the jurors
that to convict, they must be satis-
* fled of the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. An instruc-
tion on reasonable doubt that has
received frequent sanction and has
been quoted many times is found
in Commonwealth v. Webster, 59
Mass. 320 (1850). Reasonable
doubt, the court said, is "that state
of the case, which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of
the evidence, leaves the minds of
the jurors in that condition that
they cannot say that they feel an
abiding conviction, to a moral cer-
tainty, of the truth of the charge.
. . . The evidence must establish
the truth of the fact to a reason-
able and moral certainty; a cer-
tainty that convinces and directs
the understanding, and satisfies the
reason and judgment. . . . This
we take to be proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."
An instruction sometimes ap-
proved is "there is a reasonable
doubt when the evidence fails to
satisfy the jury with such certainty
that a prudent man would feel
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safe in acting upon it in his own
important affairs." This defini-
tion, designated the "business test,"
has been accepted to some degree
in a number of jurisdictions.
Some states permit reasonable
doubt to be compared to the doubt
which arises in the "important" or
"graver" transactions of life. Peo-
pie v. Lenhardt, 340 Ill. 538, 173
N. E. 155 (1930); Martin v. State,
67 Neb. 36, 93 N. W. 161 (1903);
Commonwealth v. Green, 292 Pa.
579, 141 AtI. 624 (1928); State v.
Harras, 25 Wash. 416, 65 Pac. 774
(1901); State v. Watson, 103 W.
Va. 482, 138 S. E. 117 (1927) (in-
struction unnecessary but not re-
versible error). Other jurisdic-
tions consider such a standard too
low a degree of care and require
that this test be applied only to
the "most important" affairs or to
matters of the "highest impor-
tance." Averheart v. State, 158
Ark. 639, 238 S. W. 620 (1922);
Beneks v. State, 196 N. E. 73 (Ind.
3935); State v. Crockett, 59 Ore.
76, 65 Pac. 447 (1901) (instruction
undesirable but not so misleading
as to constitute reversible error);
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 153 Va.
909, 150 S. E. 407 (1929); see Peo-
ple v. Albers, 137 Mich. 678, 691,
100 N. W. 908, 913 (1904). Most
courts that uphold the use of the
business test feel that it elucidates
the expression of reasonable doubt
and aids the ordinary juror to a
proper comprehension of what is
implied by the term. See Com-
monwealth v. Andrews, 234 Pa. 597,
608, 83 Atl. 412, 415 (1912).
However, other jurisdictions
wholly reject the business test.
Burchleld v. State, 123 So. 281
(Ala. App. 1929); Nelms v. State,
123 Ga. 575, 51 S. E. 588 (1905);
Jane v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 30
(1859); People v. Montlake, 172 N.
Y. S. 102 (1918); State v. Morris,
41 Wyo. 128, 283 Pac. 406 (1929).
The refusal to apply the test is
based on two grounds. The first
is that the judgment of reasonable
men in the affairs of life, however
important, is influenced and con-
trolled merely by a preponderance
of the evidence. In criminal cases
something more is required, and
consequently, use of the business
test is likely to lead jurors to be-
lieve wrongly that they may con-
vict on a preponderance of the evi-
dence. See State v. Morris, supra.
The other ground for rejection is
that the phrase "reasonable doubt"
is self-explanatory and any defini-
tion tends only to confuse the jury
and render uncertain an expres-
sion which, standing alone, is in-
telligible and certain. See Nelms
v. State, supra. The federal rule,
as set forth in the leading case of
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430 (1886),
approves an instruction using the
business test when it is part of the
more elaborate charge that "if you
can reconcile the evidence with
any reasonable hypothesis consis-
tent with the defendant's inno-
cence you should do so and in that
case find him not guilty." Accord:
Shepherd v. United States, 236
Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916).
For the jury to determine guilt
by the business test is undesirable.
It should not be reversible error
when confined to important issues
and when qualified by instruction.
When it is the kind of judgment
used in trivial commercial trans-
actions it undermines reasonable
doubt and should be cause for re-
versal. "Reasonable doubt" is clear
and attempts to define it may lead
to confusion. See 5 WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2497.
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